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other Code states since it involves interpretation of a uniform law.3 7 Courts
in these states, however, may choose to limit the effects of the holding by
strictly limiting the case to its own facts. Indeed, the court stated that the
logic of the holding may apply only in a few instances.3 8 Unfortunately,
since most forged indorsements are not restrictive in nature, the courts
inclined to uphold as a matter of policy a direct cause of action by a
drawer against a depositary bank are in most cases left without an acceptable theory of justification in the Code.
NEIL E. SPRAGUE

CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL
COURT RESOLUTION OF PROPERTY DISPUTES
ARISING FROM RELIGIOUS SCHISM
Jones v. Wolf'
The Vineville Presbyterian Church (VPC) of Macon, Georgia, was
organized and affiliated with the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS) in 1904. The congregation
purchased property in Macon upon which it built a meeting house. In
1973 the congregation voted, 164-94, to leave the PCUS. After notifying
the PCUS of this decision, the majority affiliated with the Presbyterian
Church in America, a separate denomination. The PCUS promptly excommunicated the members of the majority faction and declared the minority "the true congregation of the [VPC]." 2 The PCUS further decreed
that the majority had "forfeited . . . all rights to the property of the congregation." 3 The majority ignored this finding and retained possession of
the meeting house property. The minority sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in federal court to establish its exclusive right to the property on
the basis of the PCUS decree. The complaint was dismissed for lack of
4
jurisdiction.
37. See Foxco Indus., Ltd. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir.

1979).

38. 46 N.Y.2d at 466, 386 N.E.2d at 1322, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
1. 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
2. Lucas v. Hope, 515 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Shortly thereafter the minority sought relief in a Georgia court on
the basis of the PCUS decree. Under Georgia law, however, disputes over
church property are not resolved simply by enforcing the decision of the
authorized tribunal within the church hierarchy. Instead, a claimant must
show that there is an express provision in the deed to the property, the
corporate charter of the congregation, or the constitution of the general
church which provides that upon schism, the property is to be held in
trust for the claimant or the entity under which the claimant derives his
purported interest. 5 If such provision is not present, the property is
awarded on the basis of legal title, regardless of the nature of the affiliation
with the hierarchy. 6 The Georgia court found no provision for such an
interest in the PCUS, which was not a party to the suit.7 The court awarded
the property, which had been conveyed to the "Trustees of Vineville Presbyterian Church,"8 to the majority faction of the VPC, without explanation
of why that faction rather than the minority held title. The Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed 9 and the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari. 10
In a five to four decision the Supreme Court refused to require that
state courts enforce the determination of the appropriate ecclesiastical
tribunal in all disputes over control of church property." The Court held
that the states may use any method of resolving church property disputes
which meets the requirements of a new, two-part constitutional test. In
particular, the Court stated that a method used in resolving church property
12
disputes, generally referred to as the "neutral principles" approach,
satisfied this new two-part test. It noted that in applying the neutral
principles approach, the Georgia court appeared to adopt a presumption,
ordinarily applied when a non-profit corporation is at odds internally,' 3
that a majority of its members represent the corporation.' 4 Because adop5. Jones v. Wolf, __ Ga.-, 260 S.E.2d 84, 84-85 (1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980); Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 210, 243 S.E.2d
860, 863 (1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979); Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 37, 222
S.E.2d 322, 327, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Eastern
Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 260, 167 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
6. See cases cited note 5 supra.
7. 241 Ga. 208, 212, 243 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
8. 99 S. Ct. at 3022.
9. 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
10. 99 S. Ct. 247 (1978).
11. 99 S.Ct. at 3026.
12. Id. at 3025, 3027. For a general discussion of the neutral principles approach, see text accompanying notes 68-70 infra.
13. See H. OLECK, NoN-PRoFIT CoRPoRATIoNs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND AssoCIA§ 337 (3d ed. 1974). See also Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131

TIONS

(1872) (congregational church); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725 (1872)
(dicta) (congregational church).
14. 99 S. Ct. at 3027. The Court noted that the majoritarian presumption
would not violate its newly pronounced constitutional test for resolution of church
property disputes. Id.
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tion of the majoritarian presumption is an issue of state law,' 5 and it
could not be determined whether the Georgia court had adopted such a
presumption, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for determination of the law of Georgia.
Historically,' 8 federal courts17 and a majority of state courts's have
resolved church property disputes by following the approach taken in the
seminal case of Watson v. Jones.19 In Watson, the United States Supreme
Court held that a civil court should defer its decision to the resolution of
the dispute reached by an authoritative tribunal within the church.20
Later, after the incorporation of the first amendment religion dauses
against the states, 2 ' the Supreme Court did not require the states to follow
the deference approach, 22 although several commentators 23 have inter15. Id. at 3029.
16. The non-constitutional development of civil court resolution of church
property disputes is discussed in Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First
Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 347, and Note,
judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 HAxv. L.
R v. 1142 (1962). Missouri's approach to the resolution of church property disputes is discussed in Hughes, The Role of Courts in Church Property Disputes,
38 Mo. L. REv. 624 (1973). Only one Missouri case dealing with a church property
dispute has been reported since 1973. See Fast v. Smyth, 527 S.W.2d 673 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1975).
17. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Bouldin
v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679 (1872); Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839 (N.D. Ohio 1893), aff'd, 92 F. 214
(6th Cir. 1899). These cases were decided before the "federal common law" was
abandoned in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. See cases collected at 66 Am. JuR. 2d Religious Societies §§ 46, 51 (1973);
Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 324 (1973).
19. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
20. Although informed by first amendment considerations, Watson was decided under federal common law and thus was never binding upon the states.
Sae Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 447 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
21. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment dause).
22. See cases cited note 20 supra. See also Maryland & Virginia Eldership v.
Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., E. BARRE=T, CONSrrUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1497
(5th ed. 1977); McKeag, Problem of Resolving Church Property Disputes in
HierarchicalChurches, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 281, 295 (1977); Note, Constitutional LawLimits on Judicial Review of HierarchicalChurch Decisions, 45 FoanA~M~

L. REv.

992, 999-1000 (1977); Note, "And of your law, look ye to it"-The State's Role in
EcclesiasticalProperty Disputes-Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United
States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 138, 148. Contra, Note,

Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich: The Continuing Crusade for
Separation of Church and State, 18 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 655, 675 (1977); Note,
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-The Role of Civil Courts in Church Disputes, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 904. The dissent in Jones which represents four of the
seven Justices that concurred in Serbian takes the view that Serbian does require
deference. 99 S. Ct. at 3033-34 ("[t]his court has held that the civil courts must
give effect to the duly made decisions of the highest body within the hierarchy that
has considered the dispute").
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preted a later case, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,2

4

as requiring deference. The Court did hold, however, that the Constitution
"severely" restricts the role that civil courts may play in resolving church
property disputes. 2 5 As the misunderstandings over Serbian suggest, the
exact nature of these restrictions was not dear. The holding in Jones is
significant because it is the first time the Court has clearly set out the
limitations placed upon the states in handling church property disputes.
The first part of the test announced in Jones requires that if a civil
court makes the resolution of a church property dispute turn on a controverted matter of religious doctrine or practice, then the court must
resort for decision of that issue to the decision reached by the church's
authoritative tribunals.2 0 The difference between this requirement and the
rule in Watson is that Watson required deference to the ultimate resolution
of the dispute, while Jones only requires deference for certain issues reached
in the course of arriving at the ultimate resolution of the dispute.
Under the Jones test, one challenging a civil court's action must show
that the civil court resolved a "religious" controversy. The Court has not
precisely defined religious controversy, but in past decisions has provided
considerable guidance in identifying religious matters. In Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,2 7 the

Court held that a civil court's resolution of issues concerning church
doctrine, such as whether the PCUS had adhered to its original theology,
is impermissible. 2s In Serbian, the Court held that the constitutional restriction on civil court resolution of religious disputes also applied to
matters of internal discipline, organization, and procedure. 2 9 Matters such
as the allocation of power within the church,3 0 the credentials of the
clergy, 31 and the status of members in fellowship 82 are clearly included in
the Serbian prohibition.
The holding in Serbian went further than prior Supreme Court holdings in placing restrictions on civil court resolution of church property
disputes. Under Watson, civil courts could refuse to enforce the church's
decision in cases of fraud, collusion, or where the tribunal had so deviated
24. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
25. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian
Church, 293 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
26. 99 S. Ct. at 3025.
27. 293 U.S. 440 (1969).
28. Id. at 449-50. The offensive findings concerning church doctrine made
by the civil court in Presbyterian were that the church was "making pronouncements and recommendations concerning civil, economic, social and political matters" and "that the general church has . . . made pronouncements in matters

involving international issues such as the Vietnam conflict." Id. at 442 n.l.
29. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Miivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710
(1976).
S0. Id. at 708, 722-23.
31. Id. at 709.
32. Id. at 713-14.
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from church regulations as to have acted arbitrarily.3 3 In Serbian, the
Eastern Orthodox Church had stripped Milivojevich, a subordinate figure
in the church, of his bishopric. Milivojevich filed suit in state court to
enjoin those ordained in his place from interfering with the assets of the
diocese. As his right to control the disputed property was derived solely
from his clerical status, he also sought a declaration that he was "the true
34
...Bishop."
The state court did not purport to invest Milivojevich with
the powers of the bishopric but did invalidate his defrockment because of
arbitrariness by the hierarchy in failing to comply with its own "penal
code." 35 The Supreme Court invalidated the Watson arbitrariness exception, and held that the church tribunal is the exclusive judge of its own
need to follow established procedure.3 6 The Court also indicated that this
holding would apply whether or not the church procedure in question had
theological origins.37 Considering the holdings in Presbyterianand Serbian,
it appears that the phrase "religious controversy" has been defined sufficiently broad by the Court to encompass the determination of the propriety
of almost any position or organizational action taken by a church.
The Supreme Court has allowed civil courts to exercise independent
judgment on one religious matter: the location of the authoritative tribunal within the church.38 This issue may arise in one of two instances.
First, there may be two tribunals claiming to speak for the general church.
Second, a subordinate unit within the church may claim an autonomy the
hierarchy denies. The scope of the civil court's independent judgment in
these situations, however, is again severely circumscribed. 3 9 The Jones
Court intimated that the independent judgment of a civil court "would
appear to" be limited to cases where the locus of authority within the
church is not "ambiguous."4 0 This restriction was applied to the case of a
purportedly autonomous subordinate in Serbian. The Eastern Orthodox
Church in Serbian had divided the diocese into three smaller dioceses.
Milivojevich, as putative spokesman for the diocese, claimed that the reorganization was "in clear and palpable excess of [the hierarchy's] jurisdiction" because earlier agreements between the hierarchy and the diocese
"manifested a clear intention [that the diocese] retain independence and
33. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929);
Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); Brundage v. Deardorf, 55
F. 839 (N.D. Ohio 1893), aff'd, 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899).
34. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708
(1976).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 714-15.
37. Id. at 712. ("it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions
are to be accepted as matters of faith, whether or not ...

measurable by objective

criteria").
38. 99 S.Ct. at 3026.
39. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-09 (1976); Maryland Sc Virginia Eldership v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S.
367, 368-70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
40. 99 S. Ct. at 3026 (emphasis added).
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autonomy in its administrative affairs." 41 The Eastern Orthodox Church,
which had jurisdiction to determine internal allocations of power, 42 interpreted these agreements to give autonomy only in the day-to-day administration of church property. The Supreme Court prohibited any independent civil court determination of the question because the provisions
setting out the internal structure of the church "were not so express that
the civil court could enforce them without engaging in a searching and
therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity." 43 Therefore, an
autonomous subordinate's claim must yield to the claim of the general
church if the locus of authority is ambiguous. In a case where two tribunals
claim to speak for the church, a court following the Watson deference
approach would appear to be required by Jones either to assume that the
first party in court represents the church, or abandon deference for a
"neutral principles"-type analysis.
Finally, the Court has made it dear that a civil court need not defer
to the church tribunal's ultimate award merely because of the presence of
one ecclesiastical issue among the several issues to be decided by the court
in the course of its ultimate award of the property. In Serbian, the civil
court was required to accept the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals within the church "in their application to the religious issues of
doctrine or polity before [the civil court]." 44 Jones contains a similar
statement.4 5 This language indicates that the deference required by the
Constitution is limited to religious controversies before the court. At some
point, however, a state's approach to the ultimate resolution of the controversy may become so riddled with religious considerations that a civil
court must defer to the church tribunal's ultimate resolution.4 6
While the prohibition against civil court resolution of religious controversies is a longstanding tradition in constitutional law, the second
part of the test applied in Jones is new to constitutional analysis and
therefore has not been fully developed. This part of the test requires that
a state's approach to resolving church property disputes be sufficiently
flexible so that "a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over
the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the desires
of the members." 47 The origin of this test is the first amendment, which
protects religious organizations from state interference with the form of
48
church government they choose.
This interference might occur if a state refused to recognize the de41.
(1976).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720-21
ld. at 721.
Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
99 S.Ct. at 8026.
Id. at 3028.
Id. at 3026.
See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
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cisions of the church government in church property disputes. 49 Such a
result first came before the Supreme Court in Maryland & Virginia Eldership v. Church of God, Inc.50 In Maryland & Virginia Eldership, the Court
upheld Maryland's approach to the resolution of church property disputes.
It dismissed an appeal on the sole ground that "the Maryland court's
resolution . . . involved no inquiry into religious doctrine." 51 Georgia's

approach is based on, and is identical to the Maryland approach.5 2 Unlike
the Maryland court in Maryland & Virginia Eldership,5s however, the
Georgia court in Jones actually contravened the desires of the church and
its members concerning the resolution of the property dispute. Under the
PCUS constitution, property is owned by the congregation 5 4 and managed
by the ruling elders of the congregation, 55 but the presbytery and superior
tribunals are empowered to review all decisions of the leading elders and
to excommunicate whomever they choose.56 The ultimate result of the
Presbyterian scheme should have been that the general church had the
49. In Kedroff, the New York legislature had awarded by statute the
control of the New York property of the Russian Orthodox Church to an
American group seeking to terminate its relationship with the Mother Church
in Russia. Thus, the legislature prohibited the people of New York fron recognizing the Russian Church as authoritative. The New York Court of Appeals upheld
the statute. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
The Supreme Court invalidated the statute as offending the free exercise clause,
stating:
By fiat [the statute] displaces one church administrator with another. It
passes the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to another. It thus intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a
church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom
contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.
344 U.S. at 119. Kedroff dealt with a state's refusal to recognize a hierarchy under
any circumstances and therefore is distinguishable from a case of a failure to
recognize the hierarchy because of a lack of effort on the part of that hierarchy
to meet the minimal burden of stating its structure in legally cognizable form.
See text accompanying notes 58 &c60 infra.
50. 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
51. Id. at 368.
52. See Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 34-37, 222 S.E.2d 322, 326-27 (1976). In
Maryland, if the congregation is incorporated under the Religious Corporation
Law, regardless of its situation in the hierarchical church, it retains the property
upon schism unless there is an express provision to the contrary in the deeds,
corporate charter of the congregation, or the constitution of the church. See
Maryland ScVirginia Eldership v. Church of God, Inc., 249 Md. 650, 659, 661, 241
A.2d 691, 699, 701 (1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 528, affd on rehearing, 254, Md. 162,
254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
53. In Maryland & Virginia Eldership, the General Eldership deliberately
had omitted from the constitution of the church any statement in regard to the
control or ownership of church property. Appended to the constitution were two
resolutions advising and recommending that the local congregation insert a provision for a trust in favor of the general church upon schism, with which the
congregation did not comply. There was additional affirmative evidence that the
Church of God allowed the local congregations autonomy in many matters.
54. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 13, 1979, at 9D, col. 2 (statement by
Rev. James E. Andrews, official of PCUS in Georgia).
55. 99 S.Ct. at 3034.
56. Id.
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final authority in deciding the use of the congregation's property and in
determining which persons constituted the VPC. Under Georgia's neutral
principles of law approach, however, the desired arrangement with respect
to the church property had to be specifically stated to overcome presumptions of majoritarian congregational rule. Thus, the excommunicated majority in Jones ultimately retained control over the property and was

recognized by the civil court as the VPC, although this result was in direct
contradiction of the Presbyterian scheme.
The Supreme Court found that Georgia's "neutral principles" approach
did not violate the Constitution because: (1) it imposed no limitation on
the form of polity the church might adopt; 57 (2) "minimal" effort was
required to express the church's polity in "legally cognizable" form before
a dispute arose; 58 and (3) the parties were on notice before the particular
dispute arose that state law required such a provision. 59 The Court concluded that any state approach meeting these requirements is sufficiently
flexible to avoid interference with the form of government a church might
select. 0o

The dissent in Jones would have required the states to follow the
deference approach of Watson as the best means for avoiding constitutional
questions in church property disputes.0 1 As the dissent perceived, once a
civil court identifies and follows the authoritative tribunal within a church,
the church's choice of government, which is protected by the second part
of the Jones test, will not be subverted by the state. In addition, there is
no opportunity for a civil court to decide further ecclesiastical questions in
violation of the first part of the Jones test because the civil court accepts
the tribunal's decree at face value. The majority conceded that the Watson
approach would meet its test in most cases, but noted that when the locus
of authority in the church is "ambiguous," application of Watson would
be unconstitutional because it would require "a searching and therefore
impermissible inquiry into church polity."6 2 In that situation, the dissent
would have allowed civil courts to "carefully examine" church polity and
to decide all ecclesiastical controversies necessary for the identification of
the authoritative tribunal.6 3
The dissent noted two constitutional difficulties with the majority
approach. First, it stated that the Jones test will "inevitably ... increase
involvement of civil courts in church controversies," 64 because civil courts
will be required to decide more church property disputes under the Jones
57. Id. at 3025-26.
58. Id. at 3027.

59. Id. at 3027 n.4 ("retroactive application" of a neutral principles approach
might create free exercise problems).
60. Id. at 3027. But see id. at 3030 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 3032 (Powell, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 3026.
63. Id. at 3034 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 8029 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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test than under Watson.65 This concern, however, appears not to be
founded on constitutional considerations. In Presbyterian, the Court observed, "It is obvious ... that not every civil court decision as to property
claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the
First Amendment."6 6 Thus, the mere presence of added suits in civil courts
should not be a matter of constitutional concern.
The dissent also found constitutional difficulty with the majority
approach which would ignore church desires in those cases where the
church failed to express its political arrangement in a form the state court
recognizes. 6 7 This complaint apparently misconceives the nature of the
"neutral principles" approach. The difference between a Watson jurisdiction and a "neutral principles" jurisdiction is that the former resolves
church property disputes by applying the law of voluntary associations68
while the latter resolves church property disputes by applying property
law.69 A "neutral principles" jurisdiction merely requires that while drafting title instruments and subsequent agreements in compliance with
ordinary principles of conveyancing law, the parties give some thought to
the possibility of title disputes arising from schism.
The majority noted that "[t]he neutral principles approach cannot
be said to 'inhibit' the free exercise of religion, any more than do other
neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in which churches
own property." 70 Under the compelling state interest test of state regulations, the presence of a less burdensome means to serve the state's interest
in providing a meaningful forum for the resolution of claims to church
property might be fatal to the "neutral principles" approachl which,
unlike the Watson deference approach, requires some effort on the part of
the hierarchy to secure its claims to the property. The infringement of free
exercise, however, must be more than minimal before substantive due
process tests stricter than the rational basis test are applied. 2 In one sense
65. Id. at 8030-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church,
398 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
67. 99 S. Ct. at 3080-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
68. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1872).
69. 99 S. Ct. at 3025. See also Maryland & Virginia Eldership v. Church of
God, Inc., 896 U.S. 867, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). The only significant
difference is that the court requires more clarity of expression for those opposing
the congregation's claim because in disputes over church property, the court cannot hear the evidence of both sides in clarifying ambiguous language, as it can
in non-religious cases. See text accompanying notes 26-37 supra.
70. 99 S. Ct. at 3027.
71. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S. 618, 637 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
407 (1963) (religion clause).
72. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 886-87 (1978); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) (no significant infringement of right to privacy, therefore no
stricter analysis than rational basis); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 898, 403 (1963)
("We turn first to the question whether the [state action] imposes any burden on
the free exercise of appellant's religion."). For strong and widely followed dicta
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there is no restriction of religious liberty at all because the state imposes no
restrictions on the types of church organization which may be expressed in
property law terms. Furthermore, the infringement involved in the neutral
principles approach-the need to write down the property relationship-is
by definition minimal if it meets the requirements of the second part of
the Jones test.7 3 Thus, while there is great practical force in the dissent's
argument that "the evidentiary rules .. . should be fashioned to avoid
interference with the resolution of the dispute within the accepted church
government,"74 due process clause jurisprudence does not compel invalidation of the neutral principles approach.
Both the majority and dissent in Jones agreed that the major constitutional problems arising from civil court resolution of church property
disputes are the use of civil courts to resolve theological controversies and
the potential threat to the integrity of church judicial systems by providing
a civil forum for property dispute resolution. The disagreement in Jones
was over the best method of avoiding these problems. Although the approaches of the majority and dissent potentially involve sacrifice of first
amendment values in extreme cases, on balance both approaches appear
equally useful in keeping the states from encountering constitutional difficulties. In view of the equal constitutional validity of the approaches, the
question of the soundness of the result in Jones should be resolved by looking at the impact of the two approaches on the states since the law governing resolution of church property disputes is state law.
The state ultimately determines the goals it wishes to attain by providing a forum for property disputes. Some state ends are constitutionally
impermissible and some means unconstitutionally impact on fundamental
rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. The majority's two-part test
separates unconstitutional state ends and practices from those that are
dealing with the impact of state constraints on property ownership upon the free
exercise of religion, note the words of Chief Justice Vinson in American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397-98 (1950):
When the effect of a statute or ordinance upon the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms is relatively small and the public interest to be
protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid test requiring a showing
of imminent danger to the Nation is an absurdity. We recently dismissed
for want of substantiality an appeal in which a church group contended
its First Amendment rights were violated by a municipal zoning ordinance
preventing the building of churches in certain residential areas.
The ordinances referred to in Douds have continuing vitality. See Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop v. Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal
dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949). The constitutional validity of these ordinances
makes an a fortiori case for the constitutional validity of neutral principles. Under
these ordinances, religious exercise is forbidden in certain forms in certain areas
by the state. Under neutral principles, the only reason that the religious organization would not obtain what it desires is a lack of effort on its own part to describe
its form of organization in legally cognizable terms.
73. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
74. 99 S.Ct. at 3031 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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permissible. The dissent would, in addition, dictate the particulars of
church property law to the states. By restricting the state's freedom, the
dissent might irrevocably put beyond the reach of the states attainment of
many constitutionally permissible goals. 75 The majority decision in Jones
is sound because it protects the various constitutional rights involved and
wisely leaves the states considerable latitude to fashion approaches suitable
for the pursuit of all constitutionally permissible ends rather than placing
restrictions on the states which would substantially foreclose such pursuit.78
KEr

H.

ROBERTS

75. This proposition may be illustrated by the following example: a state
might wish to protect the legal rights to congregational property of those labeled
dissident by their church. As the Court discussed in Watson, congregations affiliating with a hierarchical church consent to be bound by the decisions of the church's
superior tribunals even when those decisions terminate their rights to property
retained for use by the congregation. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
728-29 (1872). The act of affiliation greatly dilutes the legal rights of the congregation to the property vis-a-vis the general church. Nevertheless, commentators
have suggested that the consent to be bound is conditional on a minimal amount
of fairness by the tribunal. See C. ZOLLMAN, AmmCAN CHURCH LAw § 302, at
287-89 (1933); Bernard, Churches, Members and the Role of the Courts: Toward
a ContractualAnalysis, 51 NonE DAm LAw. 545, 559-62, 567-69 (1976); Sampen,
Civil Courts, Church Property, and Neutral Principles: A Dissenting View, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 543, 566-68, 573. Church members generally do not subject the rights
to their property to arbitrary and capricious termination. After Serbian, however,
a state following Watson must enforce even arbitrary decisions of the tribunal. If
there is a valid approach under the majority's test which would allow attainment
of this goal, the dissent would subvert a salutary state endeavor with no compensating furtherance of constitutionally protected rights.
76. There are two arguments for abandonment of the Watson approach
which have nothing to do with the state's purposes in providing a forum for
resolution of church property disputes. The initial determination under Watson
of the locus of authority in the church is an ecclesiastical question according to
Jones which can only be decided by the civil court if the locus of authority is not
ambiguous. The first argument against the Watson approach is that the state
must develop another approach in anticipation of these ambiguous cases because
it may not inquire further if the locus of authority is ambiguous. The second
argument arises from the possibility of the existence within the state of two
methods of resolving church property disputes: one for ambiguous cases and the
Watson approach for unambiguous cases. Because cases dealing with an ambiguous
church political arrangement will be, as the majority noted in Jones, rare, the
hierarchy might naturally neglect to meet the requirements of the alternative
approach, whatever it may be. A shrewd dissident group sensing a better chance
to retain the church's property under the alternative approach developed for
ambiguous cases might be encouraged by the existence of the dual system of law
to attempt grand usurpation schemes in hopes of confusing the church polity
question under Watson to the point of ambiguity. Thus, the dissidents would
receive treatment by the state under the more favorable alternative approach and
already bitter schisms would be indirectly aggravated by the state.
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